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Police Violence in The Wire
Jonathan Masur† and Richard H. McAdams††
INTRODUCTION
Police brutality—the unsanctioned, unlawful use of force by police
against unarmed (and often defenseless) civilians—is one of the recur-
ring motifs of The Wire.1 The violence occurs in a variety of settings:
occasionally the victim of the police brutality has done something to
precipitate it (though the brutality is never justified), but more often
the violence is unprovoked and senseless.2 Some police are one-time
wrongdoers; others are repeat offenders. Some officers participate in
the actual beatings, while others only cover up for the actions of their
fellow officers. But in sum, the violence is regular and recurring, if not
omnipresent. In this respect, The Wire is not dissimilar from other
filmic depictions of police, such as NYPD Blue.
What is different is the cast of police officers who are involved in
police brutality throughout the show. That cast includes some of the
worst police, such as Thomas “Herc” Hauk and Anthony Colicchio. But
it also includes some of the very best police officers on the force, offic-
ers who in other contexts, in other moments, engage in remarkable
acts of altruism and generosity of spirit and who reject rule-breaking
and lawlessness. Our goal is to explore these and other depictions of
police violence in The Wire. Unlike other cinematic portrayals, The
Wire’s explanation for police violence is not unidimensional. In The
Wire, police violence is not excused, as if it were the necessary action
of police who need to use all of the tools at their disposal to combat
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We thank participants in the University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, Law and Urban
Institutions Ten Years After The Wire for helpful comments and suggestions, and Alexis Knutsen
for superb research assistance.
1 Unlawful police use of force has been the topic of much scholarly (and popular) writing.
For just a small sampling, see L. Song Richardson, Police Use of Force, in 2 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: POLICING 185 (Erik Luna, ed., 2017) (surveying the literature).
2 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
140 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2018
crime. Nor is it merely the product of a few “bad apples.” Rather, The
Wire describes how organizational dysfunction can lead decent people
to do terrible things, and how social context matters to crime—here,
police crime. That is, it does for police violence what it does for all the
failures of contemporary urban institutions.
We see within The Wire four structural mechanisms behind police
violence, beyond the usual trope of bad apples on the force. First, there
is the police code of loyalty: police operate under norms that compel
them to aggressively defend one another against both bodily harm and
legal responsibility for acts of violence or other violations. Second, this
is toxically accompanied by a need to project power and dominance in
every situation. This dominance norm reflects a hyper-masculinity
common to police culture.
A third causal mechanism is the War on Drugs. The Wire demon-
strates how this “war” is unwinnable, and how it asks police to accom-
plish objectives that are simply impossible. Police efforts to realize
these unobtainable objectives leads them in some cases to use violent
and unlawful tactics where the legal means available to them inevita-
bly fall short. Fourth, and finally, police departments (like all the in-
stitutions the show depicts) are afflicted by a collective action problem.
It is in the interest of the police department generally that citizens
view the police as treating them fairly and justly, and cooperate with
the police as a result. But the individual officer is the one who must
engage in self-restraint, showing respect and minimizing the use of
force, while only enjoying a small sliver of the benefit, because those
greater benefits redound to the future reputation of the force as a
whole. Once all of the officers realize that enough of their colleagues
will do things that damage the reputation of the force, it appears futile
to engage in self-restraint oneself.
If we (and The Wire) are correct about these causal mechanisms,
the implication is that rooting out police brutality will require more
than firing or disciplining the bad apples on the force. Rather, police
departments will have to reverse the structural and institutional
mechanisms that encourage and reinforce the tendency toward police
violence. This will mean wholesale change in what police forces are at-
tempting to accomplish, and how they go about meeting those objec-
tives.
Our article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we document and
describe the incidents of police violence in The Wire, particularly those
incidents involving police whose motives and actions are otherwise
most generous or altruistic. In Part II, we explain the causal mecha-
nisms behind those incidents of violence. In Part III, we offer tentative
suggestions for reform.
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I. THE INCIDENCE OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN THEWIRE
Season One of The Wire includes six separate incidents of police
brutality. In the second episode, just as the show is starting to gain
steam, Roland Pryzbylewski (“Prez”) clubs Kevin Johnston in the eye
with the handle of his police-issued firearm, just because Johnston is
leaning on the police vehicle and smirking at the officers.3 Johnston
ends up losing his eye. In the very next episode, Preston Broadus
(“Bodie”) punches Detective Patrick Mahon during a police raid.4 Sev-
eral police officers—including Shakima Greggs (“Kima”), Herc, and El-
lis Carver—beat Bodie severely, to the point of unconsciousness.5 Two
episodes later, Bodie has been re-arrested, and Carver is interrogating
him.6 Bodie mouths off to Carver, and Carver begins beating on him,
joined later by Herc. In the next episode, Bodie has been released from
juvenile detention and is spotted by Herc and Carver, who think he
has unlawfully escaped.7 Herc again grabs him and slams him on the
ground, threatening to beat him even more severely. Bodie avoids this
beating only by proving that he has been lawfully released from deten-
tion. In the seventh episode, Marquis Hilton (“Bird”) spews a string of
vile invectives toward Kima and Jimmy McNulty.8 In response, Lieu-
tenant Cedric Daniels, Sergeant Jay Landsman, and Kima herself
beat Bird to the point of unconsciousness.9 Finally, in Episode Eleven,
Reginald Cousins (“Bubbles”) is arrested by police officers who think
he might be involved in shooting Kima.10 When Bubbles does not con-
fess (because in fact he has done nothing wrong), Detective Vernon
Holley begins beating on him and is only stopped when another detec-
tive intervenes.11 That is just one season of five; the others contain
many more incidents of violence.
In addition to these examples of violence, there are multiple in-
stances in which police officers cover up violence committed by their
fellow officers. Following Prez’s beating of Johnston, Daniels instructs
3 The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season One, Episode Two).
4 The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Three).
5 Id.
6 The Wire: The Pager (HBO television broadcast June 30, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Five).
7 The Wire: The Wire (HBO television broadcast July 7, 2002) (Season One, Episode Six).
8 The Wire: One Arrest (HBO television broadcast July 21, 2002) (Season One, Episode Sev-
en).
9 Id.
10 The Wire: The Hunt (HBO television broadcast Aug. 18, 2002) (Season One, Episode Elev-
en).
11 Id.
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his subordinate Prez (as well as Herc and Carver) on how to lie about
the incident and goes so far as to feed him the story he should use:
No, Officer Pryzbylewski, he did not piss you off. He made you
fear for your safety and that of your fellow officers. I’m guess-
ing now, but maybe, he was seen to pick up a bottle and men-
ace Officers Hauk and Carver, both of whom had already sus-
tained injuries from flying projectiles. . . . Maybe when he
raised the bottle in a threatening manner, you used a Kel-Lite,
not the handle of your service weapon, to incapacitate the sus-
pect. Go practice. You fuck the bullshit up when you talk to in-
ternal, I can’t fix it. You’re on your own.12
In Season Three, Officer Kenneth Dozerman of the Western Dis-
trict is shot while engaging in an undercover drug purchase.13 Herc
remarks to some fellow officers that if they “catch up to him, he don’t
come in alive.”14 The shooting suspect is subsequently captured, and
before he is taken downtown to be booked and put in jail, the police
van containing the suspect makes an “unscheduled stop” at Western
District headquarters. There, Western District police beat the suspect
senseless merely as punishment for the fact that he (unknowingly)
shot a police officer. In the words of William Moreland (“Bunk”), they
“mistook him for a piñata.”15 Bunk, the detective assigned to the case,
then helps cover up this unlawful act of police brutality. In his official
report describing the arrest of the suspect, he attributes the suspect’s
obvious physical injuries to the arrest itself, as if the suspect had
fought with police while being arrested. This is a lie, but Bunk none-
theless reads his report out loud with a smile: “Injuries were sustained
while patrol officers were effecting pursuit and arrest of aforemen-
tioned suspect[s].”16
Later in Season Three, Captain Howard Colvin (“Bunny”) is hav-
ing difficulty convincing the drug dealers in his district to move their
operations to “Hamsterdam,” the designated areas he has set aside in
which dealing will be permitted. As a means of forcing the dealers to
12 The Wire: The Detail, supra note 3 (Season One, Episode Two).
13 The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 26, 2004) (Season Three, Epi-
sode Two).
14 Id.
15 The Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Three).
16 Id. Another example of police humor about police violence comes from Lt. Dennis Melo in
a conversation with Major Colvin in Season Three, Episode Three. Colvin says, “Ignorance is
bliss, Lieutenant. Anyone ever tell you that?” Mello replies: “Once, but I beat the dog-piss out of
the guy with a night stick.” The Wire: Dead Soldiers, supra note 15 (Season Three, Episode
Three).
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set up shop in Hamsterdam, he instructs the officers under his com-
mand to engage in brutality and violence against any dealers who re-
fuse to move. He then assures them that he will help cover up and de-
fend them against any complaints of brutality:
They bring it here, or the other two free-zones, or you bang ’em
senseless. Anything you need to do, you do. Up to a body that
can’t walk itself out of an emergency room, I’ll back up you and
your men. You understand me? . . . Whatever it takes.17
Following this statement is a montage of police violence that effective-
ly creates Hamsterdam.
Several of the police officers who are seen beating civilians or
helping to cover up beatings are terrible, sadistic people, who degrade
and dehumanize the people they are supposed to protect. Officer Eddie
Walker robs Randy Wagstaff and terrorizes other civilians before
eventually breaking the fingers of “Donut,” a twelve-year old car
thief.18 Colicchio, after engaging in violence against various drug traf-
fickers and discussing how he would like to hurt others, eventually
pulls a teacher out of his car window for peacefully complaining that
the police have blocked traffic.19 Herc is “fighting the War on Drugs,
one brutality case at a time,” in Kima’s words.20 He racks up brutality
complaint after brutality complaint and exhibits no redeeming fea-
tures other than loyalty to his fellow officers. These three are unfit to
serve in any police department. They are the canonical “bad apples.”
Yet Carver, Bunk, Kima, Bunny, and Daniels are not bad apples.
They are decent human beings who strive to do their policing work
well. We see Carver agonize over his inability to help Randy in Season
Four;21 he ultimately has the courage to write up Colicchio for assault-
ing the teacher in Season Five.22 By the standards of the show, Bunk
qualifies as an upstanding detective. He generally avoids cutting cor-
ners or engaging in illegal activity, and he seems genuinely dedicated
to the mission of reducing the number of homicides in Baltimore—
witness his impassioned speech castigating Omar for his involvement
17 The Wire: Homecoming (HBO television broadcast Oct. 31, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Six).
18 The Wire: Misgivings (HBO television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006) (Season Four, Episode
Ten).
19 The Wire: Transitions (HBO television broadcast Jan. 27, 2008) (Season Five, Episode
Four).
20 The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season One, Episode One).
21 The Wire: Final Grades (HBO television broadcast Dec. 10, 2006) (Season Four, Episode
Thirteen).
22 The Wire: Transitions, supra note 19 (Season Five, Episode Four).
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in so much killing.23 Kima stubbornly refuses to pretend to identify
one of Bunk’s suspects when she is shot in Season One, refusing to
take unlawful shortcuts.24 In Season Five, she has the courage to ex-
pose McNulty and Lester Freamon for concocting a sexual serial killer.
She also shows genuine concern and regard for the citizens of Balti-
more, most notably her confidential informant Bubbles; in Season
One, just before she is shot, she tries to help him kick his drug habit
and start a new life (even though this would end his usefulness as an
informant).25
Bunny Colvin is one of the most noble and venerated characters
in the show. He attempts a rogue legalization of drugs to reform his
police department and reduce drug-related violence, and pays for it
with his job.26 He gets fired from a hotel security job rather than let a
wealthy customer get away with assaulting a prostitute.27 He joins a
project aimed at helping troubled middle-schoolers and has the re-
markable compassion to adopt the troubled “corner kid” Namond
Brice.
Finally, Daniels is perhaps one of the principal heroes of a show
that almost entirely lacks heroes. After initially appearing to place his
own career prospects ahead of his public-serving mission, he becomes
in many ways (but not all) the model of a public-serving police officer.
He attempts to help save numerous kids from the streets, including
Wallace and Kevin Johnston. Over and over again, he fights to protect
his cases, and the mission of reducing crime, against interference from
his superiors, often to his own career detriment.28 Daniels ultimately
resigns the top police position rather than run the force in the usual
dysfunctional way. The viewer is meant to like and empathize with
Carver, Bunk, Kima, Bunny, and Daniels, and by the end of the show
most viewers do. All five of these characters are portrayed, plausibly,
as the “good apples” of the police force.
And yet all five of these individuals also engage in unlawful vio-
lence or help to cover it up. Carver beats Bodie repeatedly in Season
One,29 helps to cover up Prez’s brutality against Kevin Johnston,30 and
23 The Wire: Homecoming, supra note 17 (Season Three, Episode Six) (“And now all we got is
bodies, and predatory motherfuckers like you. And out where that girl fell, I saw kids acting like
Omar, calling you by name, glorifying your ass. Makes me sick, motherfucker, how far we done
fell.”).
24 The Wire: The Hunt, supra note 10 (Season One, Episode Eleven).
25 The Wire: The Cost (HBO television broadcast Aug. 10, 2002) (Season One, Episode Ten).
26 The Wire: Mission Accomplished (HBO television broadcast Dec. 19, 2004) (Season Three,
Episode Twelve).
27 The Wire: Home Rooms (HBO television broadcast Sept. 24, 2006) (Season Four, Episode
Three).
28 The Wire: The Wire, supra note 7 (Season One, Episode Six).
29 The Wire: The Pager, supra note 6 (Season One, Episode Five).
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then in Season Three he threatens and then is involved in beating an-
other drug suspect.31 Bunk helps cover up the beating of the drug
dealer who shot Dozerman. Kima participates in the beatings of Bodie
and Bird. Bunny authorizes his officers to use brutality and violence
against drug dealers who won’t move to Hamsterdam and promises to
protect them from internal investigations. Daniels helps cover up
Prez’s violence and then participates in the beating of Bird later in the
same season.
Finally, although McNulty and Freamon certainly deserve their
termination from the force at the end of the series (and a criminal
prosecution they avoid), The Wire leaves us with the rich irony that
these two are perhaps the only significant police characters in the
show never directly tainted by the use, endorsement, or concealment
of police violence, and yet they are among the very few police that the
institution excludes. The violations that McNulty and Freamon have
committed are viewed by the police force as far more serious than the
regular acts of brutality in which nearly every other officer engages.
Even when Herc is finally fired from the police force in Season Four, it
is not because of any of the acts of brutality he has engaged in. The
immediate cause was his fruitless car stop and search of a politically
connected black reverend. Although he handled the man more roughly
than necessary, this was much gentler than his handling of the non-
politically connected Bodie—not an occasion of “splitting heads.”32 For
that reason, the new Mayor Carcetti would risk upsetting the police
rank and file by terminating Herc for “merely” a bad traffic stop. In-
stead, the Mayor authorizes a broader investigation of Herc, who is ul-
timately fired for forging his supervisor’s signature when borrowing a
surveillance camera and then inventing a fake confidential informant
to cover his tracks.33 The implication is that the police force cares
deeply about the preservation of certain norms—such as not offending
politically powerful constituencies, or perhaps honesty with one’s su-
periors—but deterring police violence is not among them.
How audacious it is for The Wire to lure the viewer into admiring
these characters but also show them committing or condoning crimi-
nal violence against suspects. Part of the show’s moral complexity is
30 The Wire: The Detail, supra note 3 (Season One, Episode Two).
31 The Wire: Time After Time (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19, 2004) (Season Three, Epi-
sode One).
32 See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2004).
33 The Wire: That’s Got His Own (HBO television broadcast Dec. 3, 2006) (Season Four, Epi-
sode Twelve) (“Let me ask if you remember pulling a surveillance camera from ISD, serial num-
ber AW466J-Niner. You remember that? We also need to go over your paperwork on a couple of
informants. So if you don’t mind coming back downtown with us. . . .”).
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that the viewer inevitably comes to respect and empathize with some
police characters, even though nearly all of them are depicted as en-
gaging in, endorsing, or covering up excessive uses of force. The Wire
forces us to consider how ordinarily decent people could engage in or
cover up such indecent, criminal acts. Of course, this is just par for the
course for the show, which also explores how non-police characters
come to commit violent acts. But, for the police, the show’s explanation
is that the structure of the police organization channels behavior in
this direction. We see quite a few causal mechanisms in The Wire,
some on the surface, some a bit deeper. The next Part examines and
explores those causal mechanisms.
II. INDIVIDUAL AND STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN
THEWIRE
Most fictional depictions of police violence on television fall into
two camps: an apology for the violence or the bad apple theory. As
noted above, The Wire does present a few bad apples—Walker, Colic-
chio, and Herc. Yet through the characters of Carver, Bunk, Kima,
Bunny, and Daniels, we come to see the organizational dysfunctions
that produce police violence despite the decency of the individual of-
ficer. As we count them, The Wire depicts four structural causes of ex-
cessive police force: the code of loyalty, a hyper-masculine culture, the
War on Drugs, and an underlying collective action problem.
A. The Police Code of Loyalty
Perhaps because police jobs are high stress and can involve risk-
ing one’s life, police have to depend on each other to an unusual de-
gree, which produces a more intense loyalty than other professions
(other than the military).34 The ideology of American police is that the
public cannot understand the difficulty of the job, but is too quick to
judge and blame;35 police believe they must therefore shield each other
from public scrutiny. As a result, police forces have an intense norm
against informing on a fellow officer, the so-called code of silence.36
There is a corresponding norm of police management: a good com-
manding officer will protect his officers from outside scrutiny and dis-
cipline.
34 See, e.g., JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 238, 283 (2004); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK AND JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE 89,
111, 122 (1993).
35 PETER K. MANNING & JOHN MAANEN, POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 221–38 (1978)
(referring to the police perception of citizens as suspicious persons, the asshole, and know noth-
ings).
36 See generally TONY COADY, VIOLENCE AND POLICE CULTURE (2000).
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This is how it is that Daniels can behave as he does when arriving
at the scene where Prez, Herc, and Carver have needlessly provoked a
confrontation that resulted in Prez striking and blinding Kevin John-
ston in one eye. Daniels is obviously angry at them; he is distraught
when he shares the incident with his wife and learns that Johnston
will lose the eye; later still, he stubbornly tries to help Johnston. But
those genuine feelings do not stop him from advising Prez, Herc, and
Carver explicitly how to lie, how to fabricate a story to escape ac-
countability.
Why does he do this? Because of the entrenched code of loyalty,
Daniels would lose the respect of his officers, and his ability to lead, if
he did otherwise. When Daniels’s wife Marla suggests that he
“shoulda hung them” in the series’ second episode, Daniels replies
with two arguments.37 First, “I hang them, I hang myself. I’m the man
in charge, remember.”38 Here is the simplest reason for a cover-up, not
limited to police: because the underlings’ misbehavior makes the boss
look bad. But second, Daniels adds: “Besides, you don’t give your peo-
ple up to IID [internal affairs]. You don’t do that.”39 Here is the simple
statement of the silence that police loyalty demands. And when in the
next episode Ervin Burrell asks him if he knew his men went into the
towers at night without backup, Daniels says, “I tell you yes, I screwed
up. I tell you no, I’m putting my men in the jackpot.”40 He later adds:
“I’m defending my own people here, that’s all.”41 As the police culture
defines the job, this is what he must do.
B. A Culture of Hyper-Masculinity
The Wire repeatedly depicts the culture of policing as intensely
masculine, one aspect of which is the need to project power and to
dominate every situation.42 The very first episode of Season One lays
out the masculine perspective on how to solve crime in a conversation
between Herc, Carver, and Kima (who is doing paperwork):
Carver: What he means to say is that we are an effective deter-
rent on the War on Drugs when we are on the street.
Herc: Fuck the motherfuckers up right?
37 The Wire: The Detail, supra note 3 (Season One, Episode Two).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 The Wire: The Buys, supra note 4 (Season One, Episode Three).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 135–38 (2014).
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Carver: Indeed.
Herc: Fuck the paperwork. Collect bodies, split heads.
Carver: Split ‘em wide.
Herc: The Western District way.
Carver: Aight.
Kima: You heroic motherfuckers kill me. Fighting the War on
Drugs, one brutality case at a time.43
Later in the episode, when confronted with the embarrassing fact that
the department has no information on Avon Barksdale, Herc’s re-
sponse is simple: “I say we go down to the terrace and fuck some peo-
ple up.”44 In Episode Two, Herc, Carver, and Prez go to the towers for
this purpose after Carver says, “You got to let these motherfuckers
know who you are.”45
This masculine mindset requires massive retaliation in response
to assaults of police officers. After Kima is shot, Burrell says to Dan-
iels, “Send a message. . . . See that it is heard.”46 After a day of kicking
in doors, arresting suspects, seizing drugs and guns, and generally
pushing people around, the commissioner says, “today a message has
been sent.”47 We see this message again when Bodie is beaten for
striking Detective Mahon. Kima’s participation in the beating is in-
structive. When others are attacking Bodie, Kima sprints to the scene
from a distance and, at first glance, a viewer might expect that she in-
tends to intervene to protect Bodie. But in fact she does the opposite:
she begins beating Bodie with her night stick and yells at the other of-
ficers to “hold his arms” so he can’t block the blows. As a woman, Ki-
ma is a presumptive outsider, whose physical prowess is suspect, so it
should come as no surprise that she over-complies with the norm to
prove herself. She is accepted as a female police detective only because
she impresses her colleagues by acting like a man.
In this respect, Kima’s same-sex orientation, while a burden in
some ways, allows the men to understand her as being more like
them. McNulty tells her that the only other female officer he knew
who was “worth a damn” was also a lesbian.48 Consider the respect
43 The Wire: The Target, supra note 20 (Season One, Episode One).
44 Id.
45 The Wire: The Detail, supra note 3 (Season One, Episode Two).
46 The Wire: The Cost (HBO television broadcast Aug. 11, 2002) (Season One, Episode Ten).
47 Id.
48 The Wire: The Buys, supra note 4 (Season One, Episode Three).
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Kima earns from this violence. Herc and Carver later have this con-
versation in front of Bodie:
Carver: Still draggin’ from the whooping Kima put on him.
Herc: Fucked you up like a cop should, didn’t she?
Carver: That’s one thing about Kima, she put a hurtin’ on you
like a man.49
We again see the concern with masculine honor when Bird savagely
insults Kima in the interrogation room, including her sexual orienta-
tion. Other suspects mouth off, but there is some line between ordi-
nary pushing back and serious insult, and Bird crosses it. In front of
other officers, Kima cannot let Bird get away with it, given the norms.
So she, Daniels, and Landsman administer a beating.
C. The War on Drugs
In The Wire, the War on Drugs has a profound negative effect on
policing and police culture. The basic problem is that the war is un-
winnable. As Carver puts it in the first episode, “[y]ou can’t even call
this shit a war. . . . Wars end.”50 Given addictive drugs, demand is ine-
lastic. Given a substantial poor population, there will be supply as
others step in to replace those arrested and incarcerated. Witnesses
are scarce. Perhaps the war would still be winnable if police had the
patience and resources to bring down gang leadership expeditiously,
but the show documents the many practical and political obstacles to
such success, including the fact that drug money corrupts politicians.
As a result, routine police work does not involve an officer build-
ing the trust of a community, nor developing human sources of infor-
mation. Instead, it is about generating statistics to make it appear the
police are winning the unwinnable war. That job does not require pa-
tience or trust, but the physicality of kicking in doors or jumping out
on a corner and chasing down dealers. If politicians or police brass
demand a show of “dope on the table,” some quick street-level under-
cover operations, “hand to hands,” will work. There is no time for any-
thing else.
The high frequency of drug busts attracts into policing those who
like the physical, confrontational part of the job, and trains and re-
wards them for a certain proficiency at it. Two more factors make the
problem worse. One, the drug trade is violent, as inevitably occurs
49 The Wire: The Pager, supra note 6 (Season One, Episode Five).
50 The Wire: The Target, supra note 20 (Season One, Episode One).
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when traffickers cannot rely on the law to protect them from force or
fraud. Two, drug traffickers are drawn from the poor of the city, who
have the least opportunities for lawful employment. The poor tend
disproportionately to be composed of racial minorities, in Baltimore,
African-Americans. So the drug war draws police into constant physi-
cal confrontations with young and poor African-Americans, precisely
the population for which those kicking in doors are most likely to de-
monize and dehumanize, and for which violence has the least political
penalty, and sometimes a political reward.
In Season Three, Bunny Colvin repeatedly articulates the view
that the drug war has ruined policing because physically aggressive
street-level enforcement disrupts the work of building police-
community relationships. All of this is the background for why Bunny
shockingly authorizes unlawful violence. Frustrated beyond endur-
ance by the drug war, he attempts to set up a legalized drug zone. But
his experiment is stymied before it can begin by the fact that the mid-
level drug dealers won’t send their “corner boys” to Hamsterdam be-
cause they don’t trust police promises of non-enforcement (nor is there
any reason for them to trust police). Desperate to de-escalate the drug
war, and lower violence, he sees no other way to get started except to
use violence. The end does not justify the means, but it does explain
how a decent person rationalizes the use of violence as a means.
D. A Collective Action Problem
Finally, we come to the most abstract cause of police violence,
which might be understood as the basic background condition for the
causes already noted: a gap between what is good for the police force
as a whole and what is good for the individual officer.
We agree with the claims made by a well-known academic litera-
ture on procedural justice that a police force as a whole (and the pub-
lic) benefit from public respect for and trust in police.51 The greater
the respect and trust, the more the public cooperates with and assists
the police, as by reporting crime and serving as witnesses, or simply
not running when an officer approaches. The police earn that trust
51 TOM R. TYLER& STEVEN BLADER, COOPERATION INGROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL
IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2013); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE
LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Jacinta M.
Gau, Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: A Test of Measurement and Structure, 39 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 187 (2014); Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Proce-
dural Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295 (2016); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing
at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2011); Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler,Moral Solidarity, Identification with the
Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives
of a Group’s Moral Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153 (2003);
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and respect by providing citizens with procedural justice, meaning
that the police treat citizens fairly and with respect, at the very least
by avoiding violence where possible and otherwise minimizing its use.
Thus, to a police department, the overall costs of procedural justice are
more than offset by the benefits. The force collectively benefits more
from gaining the respect and cooperation of the citizenry than from
indulging the desire of individual officers to be rude and excessively
aggressive.
But what is true of the collective is not necessarily true of the in-
dividual. In an interaction with a citizen, an officer experiences the
costs more than the benefits. Treating someone fairly and with respect
need not and should not be costly, of course. But it will be for an of-
ficer who is tired or stressed, or who actually does not respect the citi-
zen at issue, if not from simple bigotry, then perhaps because he feels
he is not receiving the respect he deserves from the citizen. To avoid
unnecessary force, the officer needs to restrain and control his irrita-
tion or anger, and his impatience, which make the officer want to use
violence. The officer incurs all the costs of this effort, but not the bene-
fit, because the future cooperation and assistance of citizens is spread
to the entire department.
One might think that the close-knit group of police officers would
be able to solve this classic collective action problem with an appropri-
ate norm of civil behavior towards citizens. This probably occurs in
some departments. But there is no guarantee. In particular, the norm
of loyalty discussed above may block any such civility norm because its
enforcement would entail disclosing that another officer had violated
it. The code of silence that compels police to cover up the misconduct of
fellow officers to prevent outside accountability spills over into protect-
ing fellow officers from internal accountability, thus preventing the
force from solving its own collective action problem.52
We can state the point with an example. It is collectively good for
the police force if suspects do not flee. Most officers don’t want to
chase someone, exerting themselves and risking injury. Whenever an
officer humiliates or injures a suspect who has not fled, that creates
an incentive for future suspects to flee. Yet while the officer gets
whatever benefit he gets from being rude or violent, he spreads the
costs to all the officers in the force, the ones who have to chase fleeing
suspects in the future. It is thus good for the force for the officer to re-
frain from using force, but that is not necessarily what the individual
officer will want to do.
52 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 421–24 (1997) (describing how a police norm of silence can be enforced up to levels
that harm a police force).
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A scene with Carver illustrates. He stands on a police car in Sea-
son Three, and threatens to beat a very young suspect who has suc-
cessfully evaded a large number of officers. Carver yells a proposal to
the hiding suspect that the officers will beat him if he fails to turn
himself in and they find him later, but they will not beat him if he
turns himself in.53 We don’t learn whether the suspect turned himself
in or was caught, but we do learn that he was beaten—a few scenes
later, he appears in the precinct house with facial injuries.54 Whichev-
er officer it was who administered the beating may have gained from
indulging a desire to retaliate against a juvenile who embarrassed the
police by successfully fleeing for a while. But it would have been better
for the department as a whole for the officers not to have done so, so
future suspects would have less reason to flee.
In conclusion, The Wire does not present police violence merely as
the result of a few bad apples, but as a part of ever-present structural
issues that incentivize police to act this way.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
As the previous Part indicates, the problem of police violence is
more structural and systematic than the mere existence of a few bad
apples on the force. Certainly, every police force should identify and
fire those officers who engage in unlawful acts of brutality against cit-
izens (and they should be prosecuted as well). But while removing the
bad apples from the force should reduce police brutality, it would not
end it. Other police would continue to engage in the same type of vio-
lence, for reasons other than sadism and a desire to exert power. More
importantly, the institutional culture and structure of the police force
would continue to produce officers who engage in acts of unlawful vio-
lence. Accordingly, disciplining and firing officers who engage in un-
lawful violence is a starting point but not an endpoint. In this Part, we
discuss other possible solutions to the problem of police violence. We
offer one suggestion to match each of the causal mechanisms we de-
scribed in Part II.
53 The Wire: Time After Time, supra note 31 (Season Three, Episode One) (“If you march
your ass out here right now and put the bracelets on, we will not kick the living shit out of you.
But if you make us go into them weeds for you, or if you make us come back out here tomorrow
night, catch you on a corner, I swear to fucking Christ, we will beat you longer and harder than
you beat your own dick!”).
54 Id. The suspect has a butterfly bandage above his eye and complains that the police
“whooped my ass.” Herc replies: “The Western District way.”
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A. The Police Code of Loyalty
Organization-wide norms such as the police code of loyalty can be
extraordinarily difficult or impossible to dislodge.55 The problem is
that the norm is self-reinforcing, as more senior police officers indoc-
trinate subsequent generations of younger officers in the same norms.
Rather than attempting to alter this code from the inside, we recom-
mend attacking it from the outside. Police departments and prosecu-
tors’ offices should aggressively investigate and prosecute acts of po-
lice misconduct, and then supplement this step by also pursuing police
officers who help to cover up misconduct. That is, they should try to
break the code of loyalty by substantially raising the costs of stone-
walling or lying to investigators.
One initial step, which most major police departments have al-
ready adopted, is to have an independent internal affairs department,
outside of the normal police hierarchy, that is charged with investigat-
ing charges of police misconduct. Separating these investigators from
the normal police department structure should reduce the influence of
the police code of loyalty and permit the investigators to bring charges
in cases where officers within the chain of command would normally
stay their hands.
As a stark example of what not to do, consider the recent United
States Department of Justice Report (“Report”) on the Chicago Police
Department (“CPD”).56 The Report noted that the Mayor of Chicago
and the President of the police union conceded the existence of a “code
of silence” within the CPD.57 A cause and symptom of that code was
the fact that investigators of police misconduct did not enforce the ob-
ligation to be truthful with investigators. “Rather than aggressively
enforcing and seeking discharge for violations of CPD’s Rule 14, which
prohibits making false statements, enforcement in this area is rarely
taken seriously and is largely ignored.”58 Tellingly for the code of si-
lence, investigators failed to
hold witness officers responsible for covering up misconduct of
others. . . . Indeed, our investigation revealed that there were
only 98 Rule 14 charges sustained over the last five years. Only
one of these sustained cases was initiated by IPRA [the Inde-
55 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995).
56 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE N. DIST. OF
ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/AV2R-BH37].
57 Id. at 75.
58 Id.
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pendent Police Review Authority] against an officer witness
who IPRA discovered lied to cover up misconduct of another.
Moreover, in many of the cases where Rule 14 charges were
brought and sustained against accused officers for lying, the
discipline imposed was less than discharge. Almost one-third of
all the sustained Rule 14 cases had a recommended punish-
ment of 25-day suspension or less, and some of the discharge
recommendations were reduced or overturned on appeal. . . .
Not only are Rule 14 investigations not encouraged, but past
IPRA leadership prohibited investigators from initiating such
Rule 14 investigations without obtaining approval from the
IPRA Chief Administrator, sending a strong message to inves-
tigators not to expand their investigations into collateral Rule
14 charges. Such Rule 14 requests required a de facto higher
standard of proof and were rarely approved. . . .
Furthermore, even in the rare case where a Rule 14 charge is
made and results in a sustained finding, officers face little risk
that such finding will impact their ability to testify in criminal
cases in support of the prosecution. We learned in our investi-
gation that there is no system in place to ensure that all officer
disciplinary findings bearing on credibility, including Rule 14
findings, are supplied to the State’s Attorney’s Office and crim-
inal defendants, even though this is required under Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). . . .59
To some extent, Chicago has addressed these concerns in the creation
of the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) to replace
IPRA, though it is too soon to measure any improvement.60 Yet the
DOJ report implies some obvious structural solutions to the code of si-
lence: diligently investigate false statements by police witnesses, sig-
nificantly punish those who lie, and disclose evidence of lying to crim-
inal defendants (which is its own sanction as it is a career detriment
not to be able to testify credibly).
In The Wire, by contrast, the Internal Investigations Division
(“IID”) is not even as good as IPRA or COPA. While IPRA and COPA
are at least independent, IID is located within the police department,
and the head of that division reports to the head of the Criminal In-
vestigations Division, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and
the Commissioner himself. The Wire depicts the head of IID as an
59 Id. at 76–77 (emphasis added).
60 CIVILIAN OFF. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2018), http://www.chicagocopa.org/ [https://perma
.cc/UY3N-ZBR3].
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agent of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
often to the detriment of officers who incur the wrath of the higher-
ups. (In one notable scene, detectives refer to him as the “angel of
death.”)61 It is thus a simple matter for police officials to barter an ar-
rangement that protects Prez when convenient and ends Herc’s career
when that becomes politically expedient.
Of course, independent investigative units such as COPA are not
enough—there must be independent decision-makers in prosecutors’
offices as well. County and state prosecutors rely upon cooperation
from the police when prosecuting criminal defendants, and so they are
often just as reluctant to prosecute officers for wrongdoing as police
are to investigate that wrongdoing. Ideally, then, states and munici-
palities would have standing independent counsel who are empowered
to investigate and prosecute police misconduct whenever it arises.
Here, most jurisdictions fall well short. Many have legal provisions
that allow for the appointment of special prosecutors in particular
cases, but the same code of loyalty that prevents prosecutors from ag-
gressively pursuing police misconduct weighs against any decision to
appoint a special prosecutor as well.
Finally, it is particularly important that prosecutors charge not
only the police officer who has engaged in the misconduct, but any of-
ficer who helped cover up the initial officer’s actions, with the crimes
of perjury or obstruction of justice. Doing so would significantly raise
the costs of abiding by the police code of loyalty and convince police to
cooperate with investigations rather than risk their own careers and
freedom. Such prosecutions are generally rare, but there are notable
exceptions. For instance, three of the Chicago police officers who
helped cover up the shooting of Laquan McDonald have been indicted
for conspiracy and obstruction of justice.62 At the same time, the
statement by the special prosecutor who brought the indictments is
telling. She explained: “The indictment makes clear that these de-
fendants did more than merely obey an unofficial ‘code of silence,’ ra-
ther it alleges that they lied about what occurred to prevent independ-
ent criminal investigators from learning the truth.”63 We must reach a
point at which abiding by even the “mere” code of silence, and not just
overt lying, can place a police officer in danger of losing his or her job.
61 The Wire: Lessons (HBO television broadcast July 28, 2002) (Season One, Episode Eight).
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B. The Culture of Masculinity
As we described above, police forces are afflicted by a sometimes
toxic culture of masculinity. Officers feel the need to demonstrate
their dominance over the population they are meant to serve. Any
slight, no matter how small, can be taken as a challenge to a police of-
ficer’s authority and is liable to be met with violence. As we noted
above, culture is notoriously sticky, and institutions can tend to at-
tract new members who value the existing organizational culture.64
Altering police culture will not be easy and will not happen quickly.
However, one potential approach might be for police forces to hire
more female police officers. This was the recommendation of a com-
mission headed by Warren Christopher that was tasked with studying
and responding to the riots that broke out in Los Angeles following the
acquittal of several Los Angeles police in the beating of Rodney King.65
The Christopher Commission found that a culture of extreme mascu-
linity within the Los Angeles police department was one of the driving
forces behind police violence, and it recommended hiring more female
officers as one potential solution.66
The Wire paints a nuanced picture of the effects of female officers
on the force. The Wire demonstrates that female officers can be as bru-
tal as their male counterparts. Kima illustrates this possibility. Be-
cause she feels pressured to prove herself as an equal in this male-
dominated culture, she overcompensates by being quick to resort to
excessive force. Note again that Herc and Carver specifically praise
Kima by saying that she can beat a suspect “like a man.” (On the oth-
er hand, it is Kima who has the moral courage to break the code of si-
lence in Season Five when she turns in Freamon and McNulty for
their fraudulent creation of a serial killer.) In any event, The Wire also
gives us Beadie Russell, who exemplifies the ideal of an officer who
feels no compulsion to prove herself through violence. The Wire also
highlights the importance of peer groups. It is perhaps no coincidence
that Beadie becomes acculturated to the Baltimore police force
through Freamon, Bunk, and McNulty, none of whom engages in a
single act of unlawful violence throughout the entire show. Had her
initial assignment been to the narcotics division or a police district,
64 Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, Punitive Police: Agency Costs, Law Enforce-
ment, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016).
65 INDEP. COMM. ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM. ON THE L.A.
POLICE DEP’T (1991), https://archive.org/details/ChristopherCommissionLAPD
[https://perma.cc/TVD7-766Z] [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT]; see also NAT’L
CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLICING, HIRING AND RETAINING MORE WOMEN: THE ADVANTAGES TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 4 (2003) (suggesting that female police officers would be less confronta-
tional and authoritarian).
66 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 65.
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where violence is rampant, she might have learned different behav-
iors.
In fact, there is substantial research to support The Wire’s por-
trayal of women in police forces. One study on female police officers in
Canada revealed that most women felt significant pressure to conform
their behavior to fit masculine norms.67 Those police who identified
themselves as “one of the guys” reported greater job satisfaction and
better career outcomes.68 Research on the Israeli and Swedish militar-
ies, which are similarly integrated on the basis of gender, revealed
similar findings.69 These effects are reinforced through police training,
which tends to reinforce the aggressive, “masculine” aspects of the
job.70 Accordingly, the job of police officer will likely be most attractive
to women who favor the existing, aggressive culture.71 And any person
who is hired—male or female—will tend to become socialized toward
the use of violence as a means of asserting dominance.
The Wire thus suggests that hiring more female police officers will
not be an automatic panacea. If they wish to alter the culture of ex-
treme masculinity, police forces will have to take additional steps. One
such measure would be to alter the way in which officers are trained,
emphasizing nonviolent conflict resolution over force. Another would
be to focus on the personalities of applicants to the police force and at-
tempt to select for officers who will not be quick to resort to force. Fi-
nally, diversifying police forces to include more women might nonethe-
less be an improvement on the status quo.72 Police departments
should take their cues from The Wire regarding the importance of peer
67 Lesley J. Bikos, “I Took the Blue Pill” The Effect of the Hegemonic Masculine Police Cul-
ture on Canadian Policewomen’s Identities (July 2016) (unpublished M.A. Research Paper,
Western University) (on file with Western Libraries, Western University),
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/sociology_masrp/7/ [https://perma.cc/Q62S-DET3].
68 Id.
69 Mimmi Granat, “They Are More Afraid of Losing Women Than of Having Women”: How
the Structural Transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces has Affected the Experience for Fe-
male Recruits (2016) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Swedish Defence University) (on file with au-
thor), http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A937411&dswid=8877
[https://perma.cc/BPU3-WXBQ]; Orna Sasson-Levy & Sarit Amram-Katz, Gender Integration in
Israeli Officer Training: Degendering and Regendering the Military, 33 J. WOMEN CULTURE &
SOC’Y, 105 (2007).
70 Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, ‘There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches’: Masculinity
Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 439, 446–54 (2002); Michael F.
Aiello, Policing the Masculine Frontier: Cultural Criminological Analysis of the Gendered Per-
formance of Policing, 10 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE 59, 72–74 (2014).
71 See Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police?
Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016) (arguing
that police with punitive tendencies will select into police forces).
72 See Linda Waugh, Andrew Ede, Avril Alley, Police Culture, Women Police and Attitudes
Towards Misconduct, 1 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 288 (1998); Nancy LeTourneau, The Role of
Feminism in Police Reform, WASH. MONTHLY (July 8, 2015).
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groups and hire a substantial numbers of female officers, enough to
constitute a critical mass within the force as a whole, or at least some
subunits. If enough officers are concentrated within particular units of
the police force, they might have the effect of shifting the norms that
lead police to resort to violence.
C. The War on Drugs
If the War on Drugs is having pernicious effects on policing and
police behavior, an obvious potential response is to end the war. That,
however, is easier said than done. The Wire does, however, demon-
strate an alternative: de-penalization, which is to say, ceasing to ar-
rest and incarcerate individuals involved in the sale and consumption
of drugs. The model is Hamsterdam, Bunny Colvin’s experiment in al-
lowing dealers and users free rein within limited geographic areas of
the city. The Wire suggests that Hamsterdam offers a way forward in
the never-ending fight against drugs, and one that would lead to a re-
duction in police violence. At the same time, the show depicts the
tradeoffs involved in such a step: rampant drug use and an accompa-
nying public health crisis. As John Bronsteen explains in another pa-
per in this volume, the costs from de-penalizing drug use might easily
outstrip the benefits.73
If victory in the War on Drugs is impossible, and surrender is too
costly, what then? One approach might be to simply lower expecta-
tions. As we have described, police violence is driven in part by ongo-
ing political demands for progress in the War on Drugs—more arrests,
less crime, fewer dealers on the corners, etc. These demands are im-
possible to meet, and this causes the police to resort to unlawful vio-
lence. The focus on the War on Drugs to the exclusion of other crimes
also creates incentives for individuals who enjoy violence to join the
police force. It might be possible to alter this dynamic if, instead, the
public—and thus politicians as well—came to understand that the
drug trade is an unavoidable background signal in American life. If
police departments were not constantly under pressure to fight and
win the drug war, they might not find themselves so frequently in
physical confrontations with drug dealers and drug users. And even if
the police did not give up entirely on policing the drug trade, as Bun-
ny’s officers do in Season Three, the police department might nonethe-
less shift its emphasis subtly in the direction of other crimes and other
skills. It might attract, hire, and train police officers who are more ca-
pable of solving burglaries and robberies, rather than merely “collect
73 John Bronsteen, Would “Hamsterdam” Work? Drug Depenalization in The Wire and in
Real Life, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. --- (forthcoming 2017).
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bodies, split heads,” as Herc puts it.74 This is admittedly at best only a
partial solution. But in the face of an unwinnable war, a partial solu-
tion may be all that is possible.
D. Collective Action Problems
Finally, as we noted, police forces are beset by a particularly in-
tractable form of collective action problem. Even though it is in the po-
lice force’s interest (and society’s interest) that citizens be treated with
respect and not subjected to unlawful violence, any individual officer
might believe it is in his own interest to do the opposite. The most ob-
vious (and perhaps best) solution to this collective action problem is
simply to sanction police officers who engage in unlawful violence.
They should be suspended, fired, and in many cases prosecuted crimi-
nally. Yet, as The Wire demonstrates and as much research has
shown, there are many practical impediments to successfully and
comprehensively implementing such a plan.75 Police will cover up one
another’s misdeeds, and they are protected by union contracts and
laws that make it difficult to impose punitive sanctions on them for
unlawful behavior. It is at least worth considering supplemental ap-
proaches.
One such approach might be to use carrots, rather than sticks, to
induce positive police behavior. Perhaps each police officer might be
offered a monthly behavioral bonus, some fraction of that officer’s sal-
ary. Each time a citizen swears out a complaint accusing the police of-
ficer of using excessive force, that monthly bonus is reduced by a fixed
amount—regardless of whether or not the citizen complaint is upheld
or found to have merit.76 The effect would be to align individual officer
incentives with the incentives of the police force as a whole, almost as
if they held stock options pegged to the value of the institution. Each
time an officer engages in unlawful or excessive use of force, the officer
stands to lose a small amount of money at minimum, just as the police
force is harmed to some degree. In addition, by offering the bonus up
front and then reducing it when there was a complaint, police would
74 The Wire: The Target, supra note 20 (Season One, Episode One).
75 Among other things, police political power and collective bargaining produce rules that
impede efforts at investigation and accountability. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams,
Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213 (2016); Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams, & John Rap-
paport, The Effect of Collective Bargaining Rights on Law Enforcement: Evidence from Florida
(Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
76 The bonus could be adjusted up or down for various officers to compensate for the fact that
some are engaged in work that is more likely to bring them into contact with potential complain-
ants than others. Also, it would remain possible to prosecute citizens for making knowingly false
statements of fact in such complaints.
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likely feel as they had already earned the bonus and would be reluc-
tant to surrender it. The system would exploit the tendency toward
loss aversion: individuals tend to behave in risk-averse fashion when
they feel as though they have something to lose. Here, that risk aver-
sion should manifest itself through police efforts to engage in any be-
havior that might trigger a civilian complaint.77
Small monetary fines might seem like weak beer in the face of the
social scourge that is police violence. We do not dispute that character-
ization, and we certainly do not believe that this system of bonuses
and fines should displace or lessen efforts to fire or imprison bad po-
lice. Our point is merely that there may be value in attempting to re-
ward police who treat citizens with respect, above and beyond sanc-
tioning those who engage in unlawful violence. Belts are nice, but
suspenders never hurt.
IV. CONCLUSION
For years, scholars, activists, and commentators have debated
whether the problem of unlawful police brutality is traceable merely to
a few bad apples, or whether it represents more systemic or structural
problems within American police forces. The Wire comes down firmly
on the structural side of this debate. It demonstrates how the norms
and codes of policing can drive even “good” police officers to do terrible
things to criminal suspects. And it lays bare the collective action prob-
lem at the heart of police departments. In these respects, The Wire
was a television show before its time. The Wire began describing the
deeply rooted problem of police brutality in its first episodes, which
aired in the summer of 2002. It was not until twelve years later, the
summer of 2014, when the death of Michael Brown and the Black
Lives Matter movement thrust these issues before the general public
in a way that could no longer be ignored.
It is not in the nature of The Wire to suggest a way forward; The
Wire is not a hopeful show. Nonetheless, we believe that it is possible
to combat the toxic cultures of masculinity and loyalty, the collective
action problem, and the unceasing War on Drugs that lie at the heart
of systemic police brutality. The solutions will be politically difficult,
and it is entirely possible that we will continue to lack the political
77 There is always a risk that such a system might be used against good police officers as
well. For instance, criminals could conceivably file substantial numbers of complaints against
police who have done nothing wrong, in an attempt to dissuade those police officers from proper-
ly doing their jobs. We have doubts that even the most sophisticated criminal organizations
would take such a step and place their members in such direct contact with the police, but such
prospects cannot be ruled out. If this became a serious problem, police departments might need
to deploy a more complicated algorithm to determine which complaints to credit and which to
ignore.
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will to achieve them. But as activists such as DeRay Mckesson—this
Symposium’s keynote speaker—continue to mobilize and organize for
change, they seem nearer than at any point in the sixteen years since
The Wire first aired.

